Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc.

哈里伯顿公司诉埃里卡·约翰基金案

I. Issues

争议焦点

Should the fraud-on-the-market theory of reliance be overruled or substantially modified to allow defendants to challenge a class certification by introducing evidence that the alleged fraud did not impact the price of its stock?

欺诈市场理论^[1]的信赖原则是否应该被推翻或大幅修改，以允许被告通过提供证据来证明所指控的欺诈行为并未影响其股票价格，从而对集体认证提出质疑？

Oral argument:

口头陈述：

March 5, 2014

2014年3月5日

Court below:

下级法院：

United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit

美国第五巡回上诉法院

In 2002, the Erica P. John Fund, which supports the Archdiocese of Milwaukee, sued Halliburton, an oil-services company, for securities fraud. The lawsuit accused Halliburton of lying about its asbestos liabilities, overstating its revenues, and building up hype about the company’s merger with Dresser Industries. The lawsuit was brought on behalf of a class consisting of all shareholders of Halliburton. Contesting this class action, Halliburton argues that the lawsuit could not be brought by all shareholders unless individual shareholders actually relied on Halliburton’s alleged fraudulent acts to make their investment decisions. However, the Fund contends that reliance by the individual shareholders is presumed due to the fraud-on-the market theory established by Basic v. Levinson^[2]. The theory assumes that all public information provided by a company is incorporated into its stock price. Thus, Halliburton’s fraudulent information harmed all of its shareholders even if not every one of them personally read and relied on the information. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will determine whether the fraud-on-the-market theory remains valid. If the Court rejects the theory, then plaintiffs would have a harder time initiating lawsuits for securities fraud, and companies that allegedly commit the fraud would likely pay less in damages.

2002年，为密尔沃基大主教区（Archdiocese of Milwaukee）提供支持的埃里卡.约翰基金（Erica P. John Fund）起诉石油服务公司哈里伯顿（Halliburton）涉嫌证券欺诈。该诉讼指控哈里伯顿公司在石棉肺病责任问题上撒谎，夸大收入，并炒作该公司与德雷斯工业公司（Dresser Industries）的合并。该诉讼是代表哈里伯顿公司所有股东提起的集体诉讼。针对这一集体诉讼，哈里伯顿公司提出异议并辩称，除非个体股东在做出投资决策时确实依赖于哈里伯顿公司被指控的欺诈行为，否则不能由所有股东提起集体诉讼。然而，埃里卡·约翰基金认为，根据 Basic v. Levinson 案确立的市场欺诈理论，个体股东的依赖是可以被推定的。该理论假定公司提供的所有公开信息都已被纳入其股票价格。因此，即使不是每个股东都会阅读并依赖这些信息，哈里伯顿公司的欺诈信息依旧损害了其所有股东的利益。最高法院对本案的判决将决定市场欺诈理论是否仍然有效。如果法院驳回该理论，那么原告将更难就证券欺诈提起诉讼，而涉嫌欺诈的公司可能会支付更少的损害赔偿。

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

双方向法院提出的问题

Whether this Court should overrule or substantially modify the holding of Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988), to the extent that it recognizes a presumption of classwide reliance derived from the fraud-on-the-market theory.

本法院是否应否决或大幅修改 Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988) 一案的判决，以至于推翻该案中所承认的从市场欺诈理论中得出集体信赖推定。

Whether, in a case where the plaintiff invokes the presumption of reliance to seek class certification, the defendant may rebut the presumption and prevent class certification by introducing evidence that the alleged misrepresentations did not distort the market price of its stock.

在原告援引“信赖推定”以寻求集体认证的案件中，被告是否可以通过提供证据证明所指控的虚假陈述并未扭曲其股票的市场价格来反驳该推定并阻止集体认证。

（图片来源于网络）

II. Facts

本案事实

The Erica P. John Fund, Inc. (“The Fund”) alleges that between June 3, 1999, and December 7, 2001, the Halliburton Company (“Halliburton”) and its top executives misrepresented significant aspects of its operations. According to the Fund, Halliburton fraudulently misrepresented three key issues: underestimating costs for an asbestos liability claim, overestimating revenues, and inflating benefits derived from a merger with Dresser Industries. These misrepresentations artificially inflated Halliburton’s stock price and, when the misrepresentations were revealed, the stock plummeted, damaging purchasers of stock during the period in question.

埃里卡·约翰基金（Erica P. John Fund；以下简称“The Fund”，译文简称为“基金”）声称，在1999年6月3日至2001年12月7日期间，哈里伯顿公司（Halliburton Company ；以下简称“Halliburton”，译文简称为“哈里伯顿”）及其高层管理人员对其业务运营的重要方面作了虚假陈述。据基金称，哈里伯顿在三个关键问题上进行了欺诈性的虚假陈述：低估石棉肺病责任索赔的成本，高估其收入，并夸大了与德雷斯工业公司（Dresser Industries）合并后带来的收益。这些虚假陈述人为地抬高了哈里伯顿公司的股票价格，因此当虚假陈述被揭露后，股价暴跌，使在此期间购买股票的人蒙受损失。

The Fund moved in September 2007 to certify as a class all those who purchased Halliburton stock between June 1999 and December 2001. The district court concluded that the Fund had satisfied the threshold requirement of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) 23(a) for class actions. The district court, however, denied class certification under FRCP 23(b)(3). Fifth Circuit precedent placed a substantial burden on plaintiffs in securities fraud cases to show loss causation before receiving class certification. The Fund appealed the decision, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision.

基金于2007年9月提出动议，要求对所有在1999年6月至2001年12月期间购买哈里伯顿股票的人进行集体认证。地区法院的结论是，基金已满足《联邦民事诉讼法》（"FRCP"）第23(a)条关于集体诉讼的门槛要求。但是，地区法院根据《民事诉讼法》第23(b)(3)条拒绝了集体认证。第五巡回法院的判例要求证券欺诈案件中的原告承担重要的证明责任，要求他们在获得集体认证之前证明损失的因果关系。基金针对该裁决提出上诉，第五巡回法院维持了下级法院的判决。

The Supreme Court granted certiorari, ultimately reversing the Fifth Circuit’s decision and holding that the court erred in requiring proof of loss causation for certification. The Court remanded the case to the Fifth Circuit, which in turn remanded the case to the district court. The court rejected Halliburton’s proffered evidence that the alleged misrepresentation did not cause the inflation or distortion of the company’s stock and certified the class. Halliburton appealed this decision, filing a writ of certiorari on September 9, 2013, which the Supreme Court granted on November 15, 2013.

最高法院批准了调卷，最终推翻了第五巡回法院的判决，认为巡回法院要求提供损失的因果性证明以获得集体认证的裁决是错误的。法院将此案发回第五巡回法院重审，第五巡回法院又将本案发回地区法院重审。地区法院驳回了哈里伯顿提出的证据，即所谓的虚假陈述并未造成公司股票的膨胀或扭曲，并对集体诉讼进行了认证。哈里伯顿公司对此判决提出上诉，并于2013年9月9日提交了调卷令，最高法院于2013年11月15日批准了该调卷令。

III. Discussion

讨论

This case presents the Supreme Court with an opportunity to reaffirm or reject the validity of the fraud-on-the-market theory from Basic v. Levinson. Petitioner Halliburton and its supporters believe that the theory is invalid and should be overruled because it leads to high volumes of securities fraud litigation, which deters companies from doing business or accessing capital markets in the United States. Respondent Erica P. John Fund and its supporters assert that the theory preserves shareholders’ ability to bring lawsuits against companies, to hold them accountable for their fraudulent actions, and to deter future bad behavior.

本案为最高法院提供了重申或驳回Basic v. Levinson案中市场欺诈理论有效性的机会。申请人哈里伯顿及其支持者主张该理论无效，应予以推翻，因为其会引发大量证券欺诈诉讼，从而阻碍公司在美国开展业务或进入资本市场。答辩人埃里卡·约翰基金及其支持者主张，该理论保留了股东对公司提起诉讼，追究公司欺诈行为责任，并阻止未来不良行为的能力。

COSTS OF SECURITIES CLASS ACTION

证券集体诉讼的成本

The Committee on Capital Markets Regulation (“CCMR”) argues that securities class actions impose significant costs to the United States economy and its capital markets. Indeed, according to the CCMR, in 2012, almost 150 securities class action suits were filed and the aggregate cost of settlements added up to $3.3 billion. CCMR also reports that more than 40% of the corporations that are traded on major U.S. stock exchanges are targets of securities class action suits. CCMR further alleges that the mere threat of litigation to companies leads to deteriorating profitability and higher risk of bankruptcy. According to the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (“SIFMA”), the perception of such litigation costs is cited as one reason among foreign companies why they stay away from U.S. capital markets. SIFMA contends that U.S. markets must remain attractive to foreign companies as a place to list their securities; however, there is a wide perception that the U.S. legal system imposes higher costs on business than do other legal systems in major capital markets. On a similar note, Applied Molecular Genetics (“AMGEN”) contends that the economic costs of securities fraud cases are highly damaging to pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies because such litigation and settlement costs drain the resources available for investment in research and development. AMGEN argues that the public depends on such companies to develop cures for serious illnesses, but that numerous securities class actions further delay the innovative remedies that normally take 10-15 years to develop.

资本市场监管委员会（Committee on Capital Markets Regulation，"CCMR"）认为，证券集体诉讼给美国经济及资本市场带来了巨大成本。事实上，根据CCMR的统计数据，在2012年共提起了近150起证券集体诉讼，和解的总费用高达33亿美元。CCMR还报告称，在美国主要证券交易所交易的公司中，超过40%是证券集体诉讼的目标。CCMR还称，仅仅是诉讼威胁就会导致公司盈利能力下降及破产风险增加。据证券业和金融市场协会（Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association，"SIFMA"）称，对此类诉讼成本的看法被认为是外国公司远离美国资本市场的原因之一。SIFMA认为，美国市场作为外国公司的证券上市地，必须对外国公司保持吸引力；但是，一个普遍认知是，与其他主要资本市场的法律体系相比，美国的法律体系给企业带来更高的成本。同样，安进公司（"AMGEN"）认为，证券欺诈案件的经济成本对制药和生物技术公司造成了极大的损害，因为此类诉讼和和解成本耗尽了用于研发投资的资源。AMGEN认为，公众依赖这些公司来开发治疗严重疾病的方法，但大量的证券集体诉讼进一步推迟了通常需要10-15年才能开发出来的创新疗法。

On the other hand, Respondent argues that the litigation and settlement costs spent by companies are exaggerated. Respondent claims that more cases have been dismissed than settled or continued beyond the pleading stage. Indeed, Respondent reports that a total of 73% of cases were resolved through dismissal or settlement even before a motion for class certification was filed, and that 12% were resolved before any ruling on the class certification motion. Therefore, according to the Respondent, 85% of the cases were resolved even before the court granted a class certification. Moreover, although ten cases accounted for almost $30 billion in settlement claims, there was no question that executives in those companies committed significant securities fraud. More importantly, Respondent contends that although securities class action filings rose in 2013, such filings were at their lowest levels in 2012 ever since 2007 and that during 2010 to 2012, attorneys’ fees have declined dramatically compared to 1996 to 2009. Furthermore, Respondent argues that the settlement claims are largely derived from external sources such as insurance companies and accounting firms. According to Respondent, more than half of all settlement claims are borne by the insurers and contributed by accounting firms.

另一方面，答辩人（即基金）认为公司花费在诉讼和和解上的费用被夸大了。答辩人称，被驳回的案件多于和解或在诉状阶段之后继续审理的案件。事实上，答辩人报告称，即使在提交集体认证动议之前，也有73%的案件通过撤诉或和解得到解决，12%的案件在法院对集体认证动议作出任何裁决之前得到解决。因此，据答辩人称，85%的案件甚至在法院对集体认证动议作出判决之前就已经得到解决。此外，尽管十起案件的和解索赔金额接近300亿美元，但毫无疑问，这些公司的高管确实实施了严重的证券欺诈行为。更重要的是，答辩人辩称，尽管2013年证券集体诉讼的立案量有所增加，但2012年此类案件的立案量是2007年以来的最低水平，而且在2010年至2012年期间，律师费与1996年至2009年期间相比大幅下降。此外，答辩人还辩称，和解索赔金额主要来自保险公司和会计师事务所等外部来源。答辩人表示，一半以上的和解索赔由保险公司承担并由会计师事务所提供。

（图片来源于网络）

DETERRENT EFFECT OF SECURITIES CLASS ACTION

证券集体诉讼的威慑作用

According to the United States Chamber of Commerce, the threat of class action of securities fraud does not deter corporate fraud among companies. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce argues that the SEC^[3] has power to bring statutory causes of action against companies that commit securities fraud and can redress securities fraud through enforcement actions by imposing monetary penalties. Indeed, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce contends that both the SEC and the Department of Justice have pursued restitution for investors harmed by fraud. The CCMR further supports this by noting that since 2009, the SEC has devoted greater staff resources to securities enforcement efforts and that it successfully obtained roughly $2 billion in penalties and disgorgements. Given such robust securities fraud enforcement regimes, the CCMR argues that private class actions are not necessary to protect investors. In fact, according to the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (“AICPA”), rather than deterring securities fraud, the threat of numerous class actions will deter accountants from providing audit services to companies critically in need of audits. The AICPA contends that the full disclosure that securities laws seek to achieve depends on robust auditing provided by accountants and accounting firms. Moreover, the AICPA claims that the risk of litigation will increase the cost of audit services and will ultimately be borne by the investors of companies, the group that the SEC intends to protect through its securities laws.

美国商会表示，证券欺诈集体诉讼的威胁并不能阻止公司之间的欺诈行为。美国商会认为，美国证券交易委员会有权对实施证券欺诈的公司提起法定诉讼，并可以通过实施罚款等执法行动来纠正证券欺诈行为。事实上，美国商会声称，美国证券交易委员会和司法部都曾对因证券欺诈而受到损害的投资者进行赔偿。CCMR进一步指出，自2009年以来，美国证券交易委员会为证券执法工作投入了更多的人力资源，并成功获得了约20亿美元的罚款和赔偿。鉴于如此健全的证券欺诈执法制度，CCMR认为私人集体诉讼对于保护投资者来说没有必要。事实上，根据美国注册会计师协会（American Institute of Certified Public Accountants，"AICPA"）的说法，大量集体诉讼的威胁非但不能阻止证券欺诈，反而会阻止会计师为急需审计的公司提供审计服务。AICPA认为，证券法力求实现的全面披露有赖于会计师和会计师事务所提供的强有力的审计服务。此外，AICPA声称，诉讼风险将增加审计成本，并最终将由公司的投资者承担，而投资者正是证券交易委员会打算通过证券法加以保护的群体。

Conversely, Respondent argues that without the availability of class certification based on the fraud-on-the-market theory, defrauded investors will lack sufficient legal recourse. Indeed, according to Respondent, this Court has held that private securities litigation is an “essential supplement” to criminal prosecutions and civil enforcement actions brought by the SEC and the Department of Justice. Respondent emphasizes that even the SEC has noted the importance of private actions. Furthermore, Respondent alleges that numerous empirical studies have confirmed the deterrent effect that private actions have on corporate fraud. According to Respondent, one study found that “private plaintiffs’ attorneys, . . . [provide] greater deterrence against more serious securities law violations compared with the SEC.” In fact, Respondent notes that managers are deterred from committing securities fraud due to the “fear of dismissal, fear of reputational harm, and fear of personal, financial consequences.” Respondent argues that private actions act as a vehicle for compensating defrauded investors when deterrence fails. Moreover, Respondent contends that government enforcement is only a partial solution. According to Respondent, notwithstanding the increase in the SEC’s budget and resources, the SEC is continuously overworked and underfunded. As such, Respondent notes that the government is limited to only prioritizing the most significant securities fraud—only those that rise to a criminal level. However, Respondent argues that private actions protect the seriously defrauded investors who lack sufficient evidence to support the prosecution of the companies that have committed harmful corporate fraud.

相反，答辩人辩称，如果没有基于市场欺诈理论的集体认证，受欺诈的投资者将缺乏足够的法律追索权。事实上，根据答辩人的说法，本法院认为私人证券诉讼是对美国证券交易委员会和司法部提起的刑事诉讼和民事执法行动的“必要补充”。答辩人强调，就连美国证券交易委员会也注意到了私人诉讼的重要性。此外，答辩人称，许多实证研究已证实私人诉讼对企业的欺诈行为具有威慑作用。据答辩人称，一项研究发现，“私人原告的律师……与证券交易委员会相比，对更严重的证券法违法行为具有更大的威慑力。”事实上，答辩人指出，管理人员之所以不敢实施证券欺诈，是由于“担心被解雇、害怕名誉受损以及个人财务后果”。答辩人认为，当威慑失效时，私人诉讼可以作为向受欺诈的投资者提供赔偿的一种手段。此外，答辩人认为政府执法只是部分解决方案。据答辩人称，尽管美国证券交易委员会的预算和资源有所增加，但证券交易委员会仍然存在持续性超负荷工作且资金不足的问题。因此，答辩人指出，政府只能优先处理最重大的证券欺诈行为，即那些达到刑事犯罪程度的欺诈行为。然而，答辩人认为，私人诉讼可以保护严重受骗的投资者，即使他们缺乏足够的证据来支持对实施欺诈行为的公司进行起诉。

（图片来源于网络）

IV. Analysis

分析

This case presents the Court with the opportunity to determine whether to maintain the fraud-on-the-market reliance presumption in securities fraud class action cases. The Court will decide whether to overrule the Basic precedent or substantially modify its standard. The Court will also determine whether a defendant may rebut the presumption through a showing that stock prices were not impacted by an alleged misrepresentation at class certification.

本案为法院提供了决定是否在证券欺诈集体诉讼案件中维持市场欺诈信赖推定的机会。法院将决定是推翻Basic案的判例还是大幅修改其标准。法院还将确定被告是否可以通过证明股价未受到集体认证中涉嫌虚假陈述的影响来反驳这一推定。

OVERRULING OR MODIFYING 

BASIC V. LEVINSON

推翻或修改BASIC V. LEVINSON案

Halliburton argues that the Court should overturn, or at least substantially modify, Basic’s reliance presumption based on the fraud-on-the-market theory. Halliburton contends that Basic was incorrectly decided and should therefore be overruled. According to Halliburton, the Basic majority incorrectly adopted the reliance presumption and violated Congressional intent, thus exceeding proper judicial discretion. Halliburton further posits that Basic was based in now-discredited economic theories, and that the Court should therefore update its precedents to reflect reality. Halliburton maintains that the Basic Court relied on an oversimplified “efficient-markets” hypothesis that scholars have subsequently rejected. Because the presumption of reliance standard was rooted in incorrect economic theory instead of in law, Halliburton argues that the Court should not extend stare decisis to the Basic precedent. Finally, Halliburton argues that the Court should overrule or modify the Basic precedent because lower courts either inconsistently apply the reliance presumption or refuse to follow the precedent altogether. Halliburton maintains that the Basic standard has created confusion among lower courts, leading to widely disparate applications. Halliburton further argues that state courts, which are not bound by the precedent, refuse to follow the fraud-on-the-market theoretical approach to securities fraud cases. Because of the ambiguous, inconsistent, and unreasonable application of Basic’s reliance presumption in lower courts, Halliburton urges the Court to overrule this decision.

哈里伯顿辩称，法院应推翻或至少大幅修改Basic案中基于市场欺诈理论的信赖推定。根据哈里伯顿的观点，Basic案的判决是错误的，因此应予以推翻。哈里伯顿认为，Basic案中的多数法官错误地采用了信赖推定，违反了国会的意图，从而超出了适当的司法裁量权。哈里伯顿还认为，Basic案所依据的经济理论现已被否定，因此法院应更新其判例以反映现实。哈里伯顿认为，Basic案法院依据的是过于简单化的"有效市场"假设，而这一假设后来已被学者们所摒弃。由于信赖推定标准植根于不正确的经济理论而非法律，哈里伯顿公司认为，法院不应将遵循先例原则延伸适用至Basic案的判例。最后，哈里伯顿认为法院应该推翻或修改Basic判例，因为下级法院要么不一致地适用信赖推定，要么完全拒绝遵循先例。哈里伯顿认为，Basic案的判例在下级法院中造成了混乱，导致了大相径庭的适用。哈里伯顿还认为，不受先例约束的州法院在处理证券欺诈案件时拒绝遵循市场欺诈理论方法。由于Basic案件信赖推定在夏季法院中的适用含糊不清、不一且不合理，哈里伯顿敦促法院推翻该判决。

The Erica P. John Fund (“The Fund”) urgers the Court to uphold Basic’s reliance presumption. The Fund argues the Basic was correctly decided and contends that the Court has reaffirmed the twenty-five-year-old precedent five times in the past ten years. The Fund further maintains that Basic follows Congressional intent, positing that Congress has had multiple opportunities to overrule Basic’s reliance presumption and has declined to do so. The Fund also rejects Halliburton’s argument that the reliance presumption is based on erroneous economic theory. The Fund contends that the Basic precedent was based on simple, but universally accepted, economic principles. The Fund thus rejects Halliburton’s contention that Basic rests on shaky economic foundations, instead arguing that the reliance presumption is based on modest – not controversial – economic grounds. Finally, the Fund counters Halliburton’s position that lower courts inconsistently, if at all, apply Basic’s standard. According to the Fund, any confusion surrounding the Basic precedent has been appropriately resolved. The Fund further maintains that, directly contradicting Halliburton’s claim, state courts do not refuse to follow the Basic reliance presumption. The Fund thus asks the Court to follow stare decisis and uphold Basic’s precedent.

埃里卡·约翰基金（“基金”）敦促法院支持Basic判例中的信赖推定。基金认为，Basic案的判决是正确的，并认为法院在过去十年中五次重申了这一已有25年历史的先例。基金还认为，Basic案遵循了国会的意图，并认为国会曾有多次机会推翻Basic案的信赖推定，但都拒绝这样做。基金还驳斥了哈里伯顿关于信赖推定是基于错误的经济理论的论点。基金认为，Basic案的先例所依据的是简单但普遍接受的经济原则。据此，基金驳斥了哈里伯顿关于Basic案判决的经济基础不稳固的论点，而是认为信赖推定是基于适度的——而非有争议的——经济基础。最后，基金反驳了哈里伯顿的立场，即下级法院在适用Basic标准时的根本不一致。据基金认为，围绕Basic先例的任何混淆都已得到妥善解决。基金进一步认为，与哈里伯顿的主张直接矛盾的是，州法院并没有拒绝遵循Basic案的信赖推定。因此，基金要求法院遵循“遵循先例”原则，维持Basic案的先例。

（图片来源于网络）

REBUTTAL OF PRESUMPTION

对推定的反驳

Halliburton argues that even if the Court maintains Basic’s presumption of reliance standard, the Fifth Circuit erred in not allowing Halliburton to rebut the presumption of reliance. According to Halliburton, Basic’s rebuttal right is essentially useless. Halliburton instead argues that the Court should adopt a direct price-impact rebuttal, instead of the prevailing indirect price-impact rebuttal. Halliburton also maintains that Basic allows for rebuttal of presumption at class certification if defendants can show the absence of price impact. Halliburton argues that the Fifth Circuit misapplied precedent when it precluded Halliburton from making a price-impact rebuttal at the class certification stage. Halliburton thus asks the Court to allow rebuttal at certification stage.

哈里伯顿辩称，即使法院维持Basic案的信赖推定标准，第五巡回法院不允许哈里伯顿反驳这一信赖推定也是错误的。哈里伯顿认为，Basic案的反驳权本质上是无用的。哈里伯顿反驳称，法院应采用直接价格影响反驳法，而不是现行的间接价格影响反驳法。哈里伯顿还认为，如果被告能够证明不存在价格影响，Basic案允许在集体认证时对推定进行反驳。哈里伯顿辩称，第五巡回法院在排除哈里伯顿在集体认证阶段进行价格影响反驳时错误地应用了先例。因此，哈里伯顿要求法院允许在认证阶段进行反驳。

The Fund contends that the fraud-on-the-market presumption is genuinely rebuttal through an early motion for summary judgment and the Court therefore does not need to allow rebuttal at the class certification stage. According to the Fund, the “truth-on-the-market” defense (the argument that an alleged misrepresentation cannot impact the market if the market is already aware of the truth) is well-established and readily available for defendants. The Fund further argues that successful rebuttals are evident in analogous cases brought under Section 11. The Fund also maintains that courts frequently grant motions to dismiss for plaintiffs that fail to plead price impact on the face of the complaint. The Fund argues that the willingness of the courts to grant a motion to dismiss based on the weakness of a plaintiff’s complaint decreases the need for rebuttal at class certification. Finally, the Fund contends that under Basic’s framework, rebuttal should properly occur at trial. The Fund therefore asks the Court to uphold the Fifth Circuit’s denial of rebuttal for Halliburton.

基金宣称，通过早期的简易判决动议可以反驳市场欺诈推定，因此法院无需在集体认证阶段允许反驳。根据基金的观点，“市场真相”抗辩（即如果市场已经了解真相，则所指控的虚假陈述就不会对市场产生影响）是完善并且公认的，被告可以随时使用。基金还认为，在根据第11条提起的类似案件中，成功的反驳是显而易见的。基金还坚持称法院经常会批准驳回原告的动议，因为原告未能在诉状中就价格影响进行抗辩。基金认为，法院愿意批准基于原告申诉的弱点而提出的驳回动议，从而减少了在集体认证时进行反驳的必要性。最后，基金认为，根据Basic案的框架，反驳应在审判时适当进行。因此，基金要求法院维持第五巡回法院驳回哈里伯顿抗辩的判决。

V. Conclusion

结论

In this case, the Court will determine whether to maintain, overrule, or change the prevailing presumption of reliance for securities fraud cases. The Court will also decide whether a rebuttal of this presumption should be allowed at the class certification stage of proceedings. Petitioner Halliburton argues that the fraud-on-the-market theory should be overruled because it is based on a mistaken understanding of the principles of economics, and the theory goes against the congressional purpose of federal securities statutes. Furthermore, the theory creates a litigious environment that deters companies from engaging in business in the United States. Respondent Erica P. John Fund asserts that the fraud-on-the-market theory is a legitimate presumption of reliance on the shareholders’ part and does not harm companies because the theory is rebuttable. Moreover, if the theory were overruled or modified, shareholders would lose their protection against securities fraud. The Court’s decision will impact the costs of securities class action lawsuits and the ease with which plaintiffs can bring such suits.

在本案中，法院将决定是否维持、推翻还是改变证券欺诈案件普遍适用的信赖推定。法院还将决定在集体诉讼的集体认证阶段是否允许对这一推定进行反驳。申请人哈里伯顿辩称，市场欺诈理论应当被推翻，因为该理论是基于对经济学原理的错误理解，而且该理论违背了国会制定联邦证券法规的目的。此外，该理论还造成了一种阻碍公司在美国开展业务的诉讼环境。答辩人埃里卡·约翰基金公司声称，市场欺诈理论是对股东信赖的合法推定，不会对公司造成损害，因为该理论是可以反驳的。此外，如果该理论被推翻或修改，股东将失去对证券欺诈的保护。法院的裁决将影响证券集体诉讼的成本以及原告提起此类诉讼的难易程度。

原文链接：https://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/cert/13-317

注释