Sony Music Entertainment v. Cox Communications, Incorporated
Defendant Cox Communications sells internet, telephone, and cable television service to 6 million homes and businesses across the United States. Plaintiffs—Sony Music Entertainment and numerous other record companies and music publishers—own some of the most popular copyrighted musical works of our time. Some users of Cox’s internet service infringed Plaintiffs’ copyrights by downloading or distributing songs over the internet without permission. Rather than sue those individuals, Plaintiffs sued Cox, seeking to hold it responsible for its customers’ copyright infringement.
被告考克斯通信公司（以下简称考克斯）向全美600万个家庭和企业销售互联网、电话和有线电视服务。原告索尼音乐娱乐公司和其他众多唱片公司、音乐出版商拥有当今最受欢迎且受版权保护的音乐作品。一些考克斯的用户未经允许在网上下载或传播歌曲，侵犯了原告的版权。原告没有起诉这些个人用户，而是起诉考克斯，试图让它为其客户的侵权行为负责。
In this case, Sony Music Entertainment and numerous other record companies and music publishers sued Cox Communications, alleging that Co’s customers used its internet service to infringe their copyrights. The plaintiffs argued that Cox should be held accountable for its customers’ copyright infringement. A jury found Cox liable for both willful contributory and vicarious infringement of over 10,000 copyrighted works owned by the plaintiffs and awarded $1 billion in statutory damages.
在这个案例中，索尼音乐娱乐公司和许多其他唱片公司、音乐出版商（以下简称索尼）起诉了考克斯通信公司，声称考克斯的客户侵犯了他们的版权。原告认为考克斯应对其客户的版权侵权行为负责。陪审团认定考克斯对原告拥有的超过10,000部受版权保护的作品进行了协助侵权(contributory infringement)和替代侵权(vicarious infringement)，并判定了10亿美元的法定损害赔偿金。
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that Cox was not vicariously liable for its customers’ copyright infringement because Cox did not profit from its subscribers’ acts of infringement, a legal prerequisite for vicarious liability. However, the court affirmed the jury’s finding of willful contributory infringement because Cox knew of the infringing activity and materially contributed to it.
美国第四巡回上诉法院认定，考克斯对其客户的版权侵权不负替代责任，因为考克斯并未从其用户的侵权行为中获利。而在侵权行为中获利是替代责任的法律前提。然而，法院维持了陪审团对考克斯协助侵权的裁决，因为考克斯知道侵权活动的存在并且实质上为侵权行为提供了帮助。
The court vacated the $1 billion damages award and remanded the case for a new trial on damages, holding that the jury’s finding of vicarious liability could have influenced its assessment of statutory damages. The court did not vacate the contributory infringement verdict.
法院认为陪审团对替代责任的裁决可能会影响其对法定赔偿的评估，于是撤销了10亿美元的赔偿金判决，并将案件发回以重新裁定赔偿。法院并未撤销协助侵权的裁决。
To prove vicarious liability, therefore, Sony had to show that Cox profited from its subscribers’ infringing download and distribution of Plaintiffs’ copyrighted songs. It did not.
为了证明替代责任，索尼必须证明考克斯从其用户侵权下载和传播的正版歌曲中获利。实际上并非如此。
The district court thought it was enough that Cox repeatedly declined to terminate infringing subscribers‘ internet service in order to continue collecting their monthly fees. Evidence showed that, when deciding whether to terminate a subscriber for repeat infringement, Cox considered the subscriber's monthly payments. To the district court, this demonstrated the requisite connection between the customers’ continued infringement and Cox’s financial gain.
然而，地区法院认为，考克斯为收取其用户的月费一直拒绝终止侵权客户的互联网服务已经足够。证据显示，在决定是否因重复侵权而终止一个用户时，考克斯考虑了月费。对地区法院来说，这证明了客户持续侵权与考克斯的财务收益之间的联系。
We disagree. The continued payment of monthly fees for internet service, even by repeat infringers, was not a financial benefit flowing directly from the copyright infringement itself. As Cox points out, subscribers paid a flat monthly fee for their internet access no matter what they did online. Indeed, Cox would receive the same monthly fees even if all of its subscribers stopped infringing. Cox’s financial interest in retaining subscriptions to its internet service did not give it a financial interest in its subscribers’ myriad online activities, whether acts of copyright infringement or any other unlawful acts. An internet service provider would necessarily lose money if it canceled subscriptions, but that demonstrates only that the service provider profits directly from the sale of internet access. Vicarious liability, on the other hand, demands proof that the defendant profits directly from the acts of infringement for which it is being held accountable.
本院不同意。即使用户是持续侵权者，考克斯持续收取用户月费并不是直接源于版权侵权的财务收益。正如考克斯所指出，无论用户在线进行什么活动，他们都支付了固定的月费用以获得互联网接入。实际上，即使考克斯的所有用户都停止侵权，考克斯也会收取相同的月费。考克斯通过保持其互联网服务的订阅来获得财务利益，并不意味着它与用户在网上的版权侵权或其他非法行为有利益往来。如果互联网服务提供商取消了订阅，它自然会损失金钱，但这只说明提供商直接从提供互联网接入的销售中获利。另一方面，替代责任要求证明被告直接从其被追究责任的侵权行为中获利。
Sony responds that, even if we disagree with the district court, the jury heard other evidence of Cox’s direct financial interest in its subscribers’ copyright infringement. But none of Sony’s alternative theories supports vicarious liability here.
索尼回应说，即使本院不同意地区法院的观点，陪审团听取了有关考克斯对其用户版权侵权有直接财务利益的其他证据。但索尼的理论都不足以认定替代责任。
First, Sony contends that the jury could infer from the volume of infringing activity on Cox’s network that the ability to infringe was a draw for customers. In support, Sony highlights evidence that roughly 13% of Cox’s network traffic was attributable to peer-to-peer activity and over 99% of peer-to-peer usage was infringing. Even if the jury believed Sony’s characterization that this was a high volume of infringing activity in general, the evidence falls considerably short of demonstrating that customers were drawn to purchase Cox’s internet service, or continued to use that service, because it offered them the ability to infringe Plaintiffs’ copyrights. Many activities of modern life demand internet service. No one disputes that Cox’s subscribers need the internet for countless reasons, whether or not they can infringe. Sony has not identified evidence that any infringing subscribers purchased internet access because it enabled them to infringe copyrighted music. Nor does any evidence suggest that customers chose Cox’s internet service, as opposed to a competitor’s, because of any knowledge or expectation about Cox’s lenient response to infringement.
首先，索尼认为，陪审团可以从考克斯网络上侵权活动的量推断，侵犯版权的能力是吸引客户的因素。索尼强调，证据显示大约13%的考克斯网络流量归因于点对点活动，而超过99%的点对点使用是侵权的。即使陪审团相信索尼的表述，认为这是一大量的侵权活动，这证据远不足以证明客户因为它提供侵犯原告版权的能力而被吸引购买考克斯的互联网服务，或继续使用该服务。许多现代生活活动都需要互联网服务。没有人质疑考克斯的用户出于无数原因需要互联网，无论他们是否侵权。索尼没有找到任何证据表明，任何侵权用户因为它使他们能够侵犯版权音乐而购买互联网接入。也没有任何证据表明，客户选择考克斯的互联网服务而不是竞争对手的，是因为任何关于考克斯对侵权宽容回应的知识或期望。
Second, Sony asserts that “subscribers were willing to pay more for the ability to infringe,” but the evidence does not go nearly so far. Cox had a tiered pricing structure by which it charged customers higher monthly fees for increased data allowances. According to Sony, peer-to-peer activity is “bandwidth-intensive,” “more data usage requires more speed,” and Cox advertised its network speeds in relation to how quickly a user could download songs. Further, Sony explains, “residential subscribers who were the subject of 20 or more infringement notices from 2012 to 2014 paid Cox more per month, on average, than residential subscribers who were the subject of only 1 or 2 infringement notices.”
其次，索尼声称“用户愿意支付更多费用以获得侵权的能力”，但证据远远无法支撑这一结论。考克斯实行分层定价结构，根据数据使用量的增加向客户收取更高的月费。据索尼称，点对点活动是“带宽密集型的”，“更多的数据使用需要更高的速度”，而考克斯在其网络速度的广告中提到了用户下载歌曲的速度。此外，索尼解释说，“2012年至2014年间，收到20次或更多侵权通知的住宅用户平均每月向考克斯支付的费用，比只收到1或2次侵权通知的住宅用户更多。”
None of this raises a reasonable inference that any Cox subscriber paid more for faster internet in order to engage in copyright infringement. As Sony’s expert testified, other data intensive activities include legally streaming movies, television shows, and music, as well as playing video games. Subscribers may have purchased high speed internet for lawful streaming and downloads or because their households had many internet users; Sony’s expert didn’t claim to know why any customer purchased a higher tier of service. Sony has not identified any evidence that customers were attracted to Cox’s internet service or paid higher monthly fees because of the opportunity to infringe Plaintiffs’ copyrights.
这一切都没有合理地推断任何考克斯用户为了侵权而支付更多费用以获得更快的网络服务。正如索尼的专家所证明的，其他数据密集型活动包括合法流媒体播放电影、电视节目和音乐，以及玩视频游戏。用户可能因为合法的流媒体播放和下载，或者因为他们家里有许多互联网用户而购买了高速互联网；索尼的专家并未声称知道任何客户为什么购买更高等级的服务。索尼没有找到任何证据表明，客户因为侵犯原告版权的机会而被吸引使用考克斯的互联网服务，或因此支付更高的月费。
At bottom, Sony offered no legally adequate theory to establish the required causal connection between subscribers’ copyright infringement and increased revenue to Cox. While Cox profited from the sale of internet service, Sony has not shown that Cox, in any sense, had a financial interest in its subscribers committing infringement. And it is the infringement itself that must in some fashion profit the defendant for vicarious liability to attach. Accordingly, under the correct legal standard, no reasonable jury could find that Cox received a direct financial benefit from its subscribers’ infringement of Plaintiffs’ copyrights. We therefore conclude that Cox is not vicariously liable for its subscribers’ copyright infringement and reverse the district court’s denial of Cox’s motion for judgment as a matter of law.
归根结底，索尼没有提供一个合法充分的理论来建立用户版权侵权与考克斯增加收入之间所需的因果关系。虽然考克斯从销售互联网服务中获利，但索尼没有展示出考克斯在与其用户的侵权行为有利益相关。而且，必须证明侵权行为本身为被告带来利润，才能使替代责任成立。因此，按照正确的法律标准，没有任何合理的陪审团能够发现考克斯直接从其用户侵犯原告版权中获得利益。因此，本院认为考克斯对其用户的版权侵权行为不承担替代责任，并撤销地区法院对考克斯法律判决的拒绝动议。
The evidence at trial, viewed in the light most favorable to Sony, showed more than mere failure to prevent infringement. The jury saw evidence that Cox knew of specific instances of repeat copyright infringement occurring on its network, that Cox traced those instances to specific users, and that Cox chose to continue providing monthly internet access to those users despite believing the online infringement would continue because it wanted to avoid losing revenue. Sony presented extensive evidence about Cox’s increasingly liberal policies and procedures for responding to reported infringement on its network, which Sony characterized as ensuring that infringement would recur. And the jury reasonably could have interpreted internal Cox emails and chats as displaying contempt for laws intended to curb online infringement. To be sure, Cox’s anti-infringement efforts and its claimed success at deterring repeat infringement are also in the record. But we do not weigh the evidence at this juncture. The evidence was sufficient to support a finding that Cox materially contributed to copyright infringement occurring on its network and that its conduct was culpable. Therefore we may not disturb the jury’s verdict finding Cox liable for contributory copyright infringement.
在对索尼最有利的审判证据显示，考克斯不仅仅是未能防止侵权。陪审团看到的证据表明，考克斯知道其网络上重复发生着版权侵权实例。考克斯将这些实例追溯到特定用户，尽管它认为在线侵权会继续发生，为避免损失收入，并继续为这些用户提供每月互联网接入。索尼提出了大量关于考克斯对其网络上报告的侵权行为采取越来越宽松的政策和程序的证据，笃定侵权会重现。而且，陪审团完全有理由将考克斯内部电子邮件和聊天记录视作对旨在遏制在线侵权的法律的蔑视。可以肯定的是，考克斯采取了反侵权的努力，并声称成功地遏制了重复侵权行为，这些也都记录在案。但在这一点上，我们不对证据进行评估。有足够的证据支持这样的结论：考克斯在其网络上发生的版权侵权中起到了实质性的促成作用，并且其行为是有过错的。因此，我们不得干扰陪审团的裁决，认定考克斯对帮助侵权有责任。
Regarding derivative works, the district court agreed with Cox on the legal question, ruling that Plaintiffs were entitled to only one statutory damages award, not two, for infringement of a musical composition and its derivative sound recording.8 But on the factual question, the court concluded that Cox had not presented evidence from which the jury could determine which recordings and compositions overlapped.
关于衍生作品，地区法院在法律问题上同意考克斯的观点，裁定原告对于音乐作品及其衍生的声音录音的侵权只有权获得一项法定损害赔偿，而非两项，但在事实问题上，法院得出结论，考克斯未提供证据，使陪审团能够确定哪些录音和作品有重叠。
In support of its posttrial motion, Cox created three schedules identifying the works that it claimed overlapped and those that did not. To do so, Cox consulted two trial exhibits—PX1, which listed the infringed sound recordings, and PX2, which listed the infringed musical compositions—and the works' copyright registration certificates, some but not all of which were in evidence. Cox compared information from these sources, including the title of the work, artist, album, publication date, and ownership information, to make judgment calls about whether a particular sound recording and musical composition overlapped.
作为其审判后动议的支持，考克斯创建了三个时间表，标识了它声称有重叠和没有重叠的作品。为此，考克斯参考了两个庭审证据——PX1，列出了侵权的声音录音，和PX2，列出了侵权的音乐作品——以及作品的版权注册证书，但其中只有部分作为证据提交而并非全部。考克斯比较了这些来源的信息，包括作品的标题、艺术家、专辑、出版日期和所有权信息，以判断特定的声音录音和音乐作品是否有重叠。
As the district court realized, this additional information necessary for distinguishing derivative from non-derivative works had not been presented to the jury. Even if the jury had been asked to comb through the thousands of entries on PX1 and PX2, that comparison alone would not have enabled it to determine which entries were derivative of each other, as demonstrated by Cox's posttrial submissions. The court therefore correctly concluded that it could not use the new analysis in Cox's posttrial schedules to decide which works were derivative and reduce the damages award. As the court explained, “Cox did not provide the information to the jury that it has provided to the court in its post-trial brief,” and “[t]he jury answered that question about statutory damages with the information available” at trial. [1]
地区法院意识到，区分衍生作品和非衍生作品所需的额外信息没有呈现给陪审团。即使陪审团被要求仔细比对PX1和PX2上的成千上万条目录，仅凭这种比较也无法使其确定哪些条目是彼此的衍生作品，正如考克斯在审判后提交的材料所示。因此，法院正确地得出结论，不能使用考克斯在审判后时间表中的新分析来决定哪些作品是衍生的并减少赔偿金。如法院所解释的，“考克斯没有向陪审团提供它在审判后简报中提供给法院的信息”，并且“陪审团根据审判时可用的信息回答了关于法定损害赔偿的问题”。
Cox now argues, based on the information it presented to the district court after trial, that the jury’s verdict was unjust because 2,235 sound recordings are undisputedly derivative works. But like the district court when deciding the Rule 50 motion, we must assess the verdict based on the evidence before the jury, not Cox's efforts to supplement the record after trial.
考克斯现在根据它在审判结束后提交给地区法院的信息提出异议，认为陪审团的裁决是不公正的，因为有2,235个声音录音无可非议是衍生作品。但与地区法院在决定第50条规则动议时一样，我们必须根据陪审团面前的证据评估裁决，而不是根据考克斯在审判后补充的记录。
As for compilations, Cox contends that Plaintiffs were not entitled to separate statutory damages awards for songs that were contained on the same album. We need not decide whether Cox's legal premise is sound because, even assuming it is for the sake of argument, Cox does not identify evidence from which the jury could have determined which songs were released on albums together.
关于汇编作品，考克斯认为，原告对于收录在同一专辑上的歌曲，没有权利获得单独的法定损害赔偿。我们不需要决定考克斯的法律前提是否成立，因为即便为了争论而假设它是成立的，考克斯也没有指出使陪审团能够确定哪些歌曲是一起发布在专辑上的证据。
Nowhere in its briefing does Cox identify evidence it presented to the jury about whether infringed works were contained on albums. Neither PX-1 (the list of infringed sound recordings) nor PX-2 (the list of infringed compositions) mentions the album information for any work. To bridge this gap, Cox relies on the summary judgment record, citing deposition testimony and the supposed absence of dispute at that stage about certain facts. But we see no indication this evidence was presented to the jury, and our focus when reviewing the district court’s Rule 50 ruling must be the record created at trial.[2] Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s denial of judgment as a matter of law on compilations too.
在其简报中，考克斯没有指出它向陪审团提出的关于侵权作品是否收录在专辑上的证据。无论是PX-1（侵权声音录音列表）还是PX-2（侵权作品列表）都没有提到任何作品的专辑信息。为了弥补这一差距，考克斯依赖于简易判决记录，引用了证词以及在该阶段对某些事实不存在争议的假设。但我们没有看到这些证据被呈现给陪审团的迹象，而在审查地区法院的第50条规则的裁决时，我们的焦点必须是在审判中创建的记录。因此，本院维持地区法院拒绝就汇编问题依法直接判决。
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the district court’s order denying Cox judgment as a matter of law on Sony’s claim of vicarious copyright infringement. We affirm the district court's orders denying Cox relief from the jury's contributory infringement verdict and denying judgment as a matter of law regarding the number of derivative works and compilations. Given our reversal of the vicarious liability verdict, we also vacate the damages award and remand for a new trial on the amount of statutory damages to be awarded.
基于上述理由，本院推翻地区法院拒绝就索尼公司的替代性版权侵权的主张对考克斯公司依法直接判决的命令。本院确认地区法院的命令，即拒绝考克斯对陪审团协助侵权裁决的救济，以及拒绝对衍生作品和汇编作品数量的依法直接判决。鉴于本院推翻了替代责任裁决，本院也撤销了损害赔偿，并将案件发回重新审判，以确定法定赔偿金额。